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We provide an alternative explanation of French legal centralization. To do this we develop
a rational choice model of the legal architecture around 1789 and the French Revolution.
Following Tocqueville we propose to analyze the French movement towards legal central-
ization as the result of an increase in the aversion to inequality before the law. We show
that legal centralization can be preferred to the “Ancien Re´gime” situation or intermediate
legal decentralization if the aversion to legal differences is sufficiently strong. In addition,
we show that when the legal system is centralized it is always optimal to allow some de-
gree of judicial discretion. This result is consistent with the historical evidence that the
Napoleonic codification, i.e., the culmination of French legal centralization, was associ-
ated with a higher degree of judicial discretion than at the beginning of the Revolution.
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This view contrasts with the interpretation of the Napoleonic codification as a means of
transforming judges into automata.
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1 Introduction
Common law and civil laws differ along their principles and their applications. Some
scholars claim that the differences between these legal systems are negligible or that
they vanish over time (Armour et al., 2009; Crettez, Deffains, and Musy, 2014).
On the contrary other authors claim that the disparities between laws in different
countries are persistent and that legal origins matter since they correlate strongly
with current economic outcomes (La Porta et al., 2008; Balas et al., 2008).
An important feature of legal divergence is the high degree of legal centralization in
civil law countries like France, as opposed to common law countries like England.
There are several explanations for the origins of this disparity. Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002) argue that legal divergence between England and France started around the
XIIIth and XIVth centuries. At that time, England chose a system of juries (leading
later to a judge-made legal system) to counter balance the strong power of the king.
By contrast France chose to let royal judges make judicial decisions (leading later to
a centralized legal system) because local lords feared more their neighbors more than
the king. Arrun˜ada and Andonova (2005) date the beginning of legal centralization
to the First French Empire when judges were still often noblemen and opponents of
liberal reforms. Paradoxically, the only way to spur a free market economy was to
promote a fully centralized legal system, in which the State was the source of the law.
Johnson and Koyama (2014) propose yet another explanation of legal centralization.
In their view, the rise of centralization took place during the XVIIth century to
address the growing fiscal needs of the French Kingdom.
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In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation of French legal origins.1 We
develop a rational choice model of the legal architecture around 1789 and the Rev-
olution. At this time, the National Assembly chose to implement a fully centralized
and uniform legal system in order to impose the same set of legal rules for all citizens
in the country. This legal equality was reached by abolishing the privileges granted
to the nobility and the clergy, but also by removing local disparities in the production
and application of legal rules.
A driving force in this evolution was the development of the philosophy of the Enlight-
enment during the XVIII century. Philosophers of the Enlightenment like Voltaire
saw inequality before the law as one of the most significant weaknesses of the An-
cient Regime. On the one hand, legal diversity was costly because it prevented the
creation of a national market. On the other hand, legal diversity contradicted the
principles of logic that had to be at the heart of any modern legal system. While in
old legal regimes like Roman law legal rules had to be discovered, in a modern state
these rules had to be rationally chosen. Since French legal diversity was the product
of local customs from the past, it could hardly be the result of a rational choice.
According to the main commentators of the period, notably Tocqueville, the desire
for equality was particularly strong in France (Tocqueville, 1856). This strong desire
for legal equality was certainly due to the legal differences between citizens, unlike in
the United States. Legal uniformization and the control of the judiciary were among
the first and most important decisions of the French National Assembly. Our model
explains why a centralized legal system can be preferred to a decentralized one when
1 Our paper belongs mostly to the genre called “law as the dependent variable” by Klerman
(2015).
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the preference for legal equality arises.
Some revolutionary lawmakers, however, favored a few disparities in local laws.
Among the alternative constructions considered the main one was proposed by a
majoritary group of deputies called the “Girondins”. Composed mainly of local dig-
nitaries, the Girondins proposed a more decentralized political and judicial system
and were described as “federalists” by their opponents (notably the “Montagnards”,
who came mainly from the Club of Jacobins).2 Their proposals were ruled out and
the whole faction was eliminated by their opponents. We propose an extension of our
base model to take account of the case where laws can be made at an intermediate
level. We show that this intermediate level of law-making is not preferred to the
centralized solution when the taste for legal equality is sufficiently high.
The last step toward centralization was conducted during the Napoleonic era and
culminated with the introduction of the Civil Code in 1804. A notable point was
that despite the introduction of the Code Civil, judges’ control weakened during the
First French Empire compared to the beginning of the Revolution. To study this
evolution we introduce judicial discretion in our model. We show that exercising full
control over local judges’ decisions is not optimal. In other words, the code does not
need to be too precise. This conclusion contrasts with the view developed notably by
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and Arrun˜ada and Andonova (2005), who consider that
the Napoleonic regime aimed at controlling all legal decisions and removing judges’
discretionary power.
The paper unfolds as follows. In section 2, we give an account of French legal history
2 The term Jacobin still describes a person who supports state centralization.
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before and after the French Revolution. Section 3 briefly reviews recent works on
French legal origins. In section 4, we propose a model of the French legal system
around the Revolution (this version of the model accounts both for the Ancient
Regime and the aftermath of the Revolution). We consider the Girondins’ approach
for reforming the legal system in section 5, and judicial discretion in section 6. We
offer a brief conclusion in section 7. All the proofs are gathered in an appendix.
2 French Legal History from the End of the Ancien Re´gime up
to 1804
In this section, we begin by presenting the Ancien Re´gime legal organization and we
end with the codification of 1804, which illustrates the prominence of legislation as
the new source of legal rules.
2.1 The French legal system around the end of the Ancien
Re´gime
Throughout the whole Ancien Re´gime the French legal system was characterized
by significant legal disparities within the country. A first type of disparity was the
privile`ges, giving specific rights and duties to three social groups (i.e., the nobility,
the clergy and the rest of the population, called the Tiers Etat, or the Tiers). Duties
differed notably from a fiscal viewpoint since taxes were mainly borne by the Tiers
(although the sharing of the tax burden among the three different groups differed
depending on the areas). We can refer to these differences as vertical since the specific
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rights of the nobility and the clergy unambiguously gave them a better situation than
the Tiers.
The second type of disparity resulted from the application of different legal rules
from one administrative area to another. The main disparity was the splitting of
the Kingdom between two legal families.3 Roman law was the legal inspiration in
the southern part of the country (pays de droit e´crit), while customary laws were
the basis of legal decisions in the northern part (pays de coutumes). In addition,
as the French kingdom continued to grow, each new province entering the kingdom
was given the possibility to keep some of its previous laws and institutions. Local
parliaments (whose number was fourteen in the second part of the XVIIth century)
brought justice at an intermediate level, formally in the name of the king but in
practice independently of him. Moreover, a decision taken by a given parliament
applied to its own jurisdiction and did not have legal effect in the other provinces.
The legal system of the Ancien Re´gime was also characterized by the co-existence of
different sources of law. At the national level, the major source of law was the royal
ordinances (ordonnance royales). At the provincial level, the major source of law was
the lawmaking and adjudication from parliaments (using the procedure of arreˆts de
re´glements). At the local level it was customary law (Carbasse, 2014). According to
Le Bris (2015), about 80 general customs and 380 local customs were in application
in the France of the Ancien Re´gime France.
This diversity of laws had long been recognized and accepted. Montaigne observed
3 Figure 1 in Le Bris (2015) illustrates the spread of legal families across France before the
Revolution.
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that each specific case would give rise to a specific law, leading to legal inflation: “We
have more laws in France than in the rest of the world put together” (Montaigne,
1595 (2009)). Legal diversity touched every aspect of life, such as the age of majority.
It went along with (or was the result of) a great variety in the organization of social
life and even the languages used, many regions having a specific regional language
and various local dialects (patois). In 1789, Mirabeau remarked that France was an
“aggregate of divided people”.
2.2 Legal transformations during the French Revolution
(1789-1804)
The revolution that began in 1789 allowed a whole body of new legal rules to be
built, rationally determined by the National Assembly, which, according to Em-
manuel Sieye`s (one of the main political thinkers of the French Revolution), perfectly
represented the will of the nation. This was a break with the absolute monarchy,
even if in practice the power of the king had already dwindled over time.
Among the first decisions taken by the National Assembly during the night of August
4th 1789, was the abolition of the old orders, rules, taxes, courts and privileges left
over from the age of feudalism.4 This abolition was not decided on pure economic
ground, but rather on philosophical ground. It was soon followed by the proclamation
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, another founding act of the
French Revolution, which begins with the assertion that “Men are born and remain
4 The complete abolition of feudalism, however, was not made in a single step. This abolition
actually took place in 1793 (see Clere, 2005, for a historical description of the process).
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free and equal in rights”. Thus all “vertical” legal differences between citizens were
abolished.
To ensure equality before the law, legal production was fully centralized and any
discretionary power granted to judges was withdrawn. The creation of a Civil Code
containing all the civil laws applicable to the whole nation was stated in the Constitu-
tion of 1791. This Civil Code, however, was not implemented during the Revolution
despite three attempts by Cambace´res.5
A less ambitious but more successful attempt was realized in September 1791 with
the creation of a Penal Code. This attempt aimed at correcting the inequalities
of treatment observed in penal cases. The codification was notably influenced by
Bentham.6 The main point of the code was the statement that sentences had to be
prescribed to all who committed the same offense, whatever their rank or condition,
and proportioned to the offenses (Lovisi, 2011, p. 281). Fixed sentences (with a fixed
basis and contingent possibilities to raise the sentence) were also established in order
to constrain the discretionary power of judges. After the fall of Robespierre in 1794,
the Convention replaced this Penal Code with a Code of offenses and sentences.
The failure of the attempts made at codification resulted mainly from sharp internal
5 The first attempt of Cambace´res in 1791 was stopped after three months because France began
a decisive war against the European monarchies. Expecting not a prolonged war, the government
postponed the enforcement of the Code to avoid adding internal dissent to external threat. However,
a bill on full equality of children in matters of inheritance was passed by the National Assembly. A
second attempt to implement a Civil Code was made in 1794, with no success. The last attempt,
in 1796, was less ambitious with regard to the egalitarian ideas of the revolution. This attempt was
made at a time where the royalist faction, which regained power, rejected any codification (Lovisi,
2011).
6 As noted by many commentators (see, e.g., Alfange Jr, 1969), Bentham clearly saw in the
French Revolution an exceptional opportunity to advance the cause of utilitarism.
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dissension among French representatives, as well as external threat and the absence
of a sufficiently strong government to impose a new body of law. The rise of Napoleon
Bonaparte’s political power at the end of the 1790’s brought about more favorable
conditions towards codification. The Civil Code was successfully enacted on March
12, 1804, a date which can be considered as the culminating part of the process en-
gaged in 1789. This Civil Code fulfilled the egalitarian aspirations of the Revolution
by consolidating previous laws and creating new ones. Every local area in France
was ruled by the same set of legal rules. As stated by Allison (2000): “Codification
of the law was a demand of the revolution answered by Napoleon” and “the logic
inspiring it is a clear body of law for all Frenchmen”. The distance between the
French legal system and the English one increased much more during this period
than at any other time in history.
One important feature associated to the introduction of the Napoleonic Code was
the decrease in the will to control judges compared to the early revolutionary period.
This pragmatic approach was taken because a full control of judges was too difficult
to realize (Carbasse, 2014). What remained durably was a combination of statutes
and a light control over the judiciary (notably via the appeal courts).
3 The Law and Economics Literature on French Legal Origins
In this section we summarize the results of several studies on the Law-and-Economics
of French legal origins. None of these studies reaches the same conclusion regarding
the mechanism of legal change, or the date of this change. According to these
studies; however, legal centralization resulted from the will of an authoritarian central
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authority (the French kings or Napoleon), and had long-term economic consequences
(La Porta et al., 2008).
3.1 Coasean bargaining in the medieval kingdoms: Glaeser and
Shleifer (2002)
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) agree with Dawson (Dawson, 1960), according to whom
the choice between a system where judges are controlled by the sovereign (royal
judges) and judicial independence (juries) “is central for the initial divergence be-
tween the French and English legal systems in the XIIth and XIIIth centuries and
explains many persistent differences between civil and common law”.
Glaeser and Shleifer consider that France and England have common legal roots, built
on customs and natural law, and that their legal systems began to diverge around the
XIIIth century. The common roots notably comprised the Frankish inquest, which
can be considered as the ancestor of the jury system. In England the legal system
took on a more modern form during the reign of Henry II, and was later strengthened
by King John with the Magna Carta (1215).7 Over time, the jury system, together
with judicial independence, has functioned as a check on the royal power (Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2002). By contrast, France around the XIIIth century moved towards a
system of judge-inquisitor controlled by the king. The subordination of the judiciary
to the French king was later strengthened by Louis XIV. The same policy was pursued
by Napoleon, who aimed at transforming judges into automata.
7 “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed
or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him,
or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land”.
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To explain the divergence between the English and French legal systems, Glaeser and
Shleifer propose a model of Coasean bargaining between the King and the nobles,
who must choose between a jury system (judicial independence) and a system of royal
judges. Each system has a flaw. In the jury system, local lords can use violence and
corruption to influence jurors’ decisions. In a system of royal judges, the decisions
made by the courts may depend on the King’s will. Centralized justice is chosen when
the cost of royal arbitrariness is lower than the costs of local violence and corruption.
For lower levels of local violence and corruption, decentralized justice is a better
choice. Since local violence was more limited in England than in France (because
there were fewer wars and local lords were weaker than the King), decentralized
justice was preferred to centralization. In France, local lords were at least as powerful
as the King and could easily manipulate or coerce juries. Consequently, royal justice
was perceived as a lesser evil than a system of jury.
The story proposed by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) has some historical relevance in
the sense that it describes the first attempt at legal centralization in France. From
historical perspective, however, this attempt did not go very far, notably because of
the weakness of the French Crown. As stated (also) by Dawson (1968), “the royal
judiciary that was organized in France during the course of the XIIIth century lacked
the means for attempting a large-scale unification of French private law. The king’s
writ did not run in some of the great lordships that owed allegiance to the king and
even in the royal domain, powers of adjudication in both civil and criminal cases had
been acquired by seigneurial courts.[...] These courts were gradually undermined by
indirect means, but many were to survive until the Revolution”. The approach of
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Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) is thus only partially supported by the facts. As was seen
in Section 2, the French legal system was neither centralized nor uniform until the
French Revolution. Moreover, Klerman and Mahoney (2007) show that the French
legal system was even less centralized than the English one.8
3.2 The road to a market economy: Arrun˜ada and Andonova
(2005)
Arrun˜ada and Andonova (2005) propose a different explanation of French legal cen-
tralization. For them, the divergence between France and England began around the
turn of the XVIIIth century with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire.
At that time, one of the French authorities’ aims was to implement a new economic
and legal environment ensuring a well-functioning market economy. The Civil Code
introduced by Napoleon in 1804 was one of the means used to realize these goals.9
Arrun˜ada and Andonova recall that “the proper functioning of a market economy
requires that freedom of contract be protected effectively”. Yet, French judges were
considered as the product and the defenders of the Ancien Re´gime and as opponents
of the principles of free market and equality of contractors. Therefore, granting them
judicial discretion would have represented a threat for the development of a modern
market economy. On the contrary, legal centralization and control over the judiciary
8 La Porta et al. (2008) recognize the criticism on this point but conclude that it is not so
important, since “regardless of whether the revolutionary or the medieval story is correct, they
have very similar empirical predictions”, notably that in both cases, a civil law system exhibits
lesser judicial independence than a common law one. We discuss this point in the section 7.
9 The approach followed by Arrun˜ada and Andonova is consistent with the interpretation of the
French revolution as a “revolution bourgeoise”, in which the bourgeoisie was the main agent of
change.
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allowed freedom of contract to be protected.
While the story told by Arrun˜ada and Andonova has some relevance, it fits histori-
cal evidence only partially. Concerning the Napoleonic centralization and the will to
transform judges into automata, it is important to note that French legal centraliza-
tion and the will to remove discretionary power from judges were clearly decided in
the early days of the Revolution, and not by Napoleon, who indeed softened this con-
trol. In 1790, the laws on judicial organization stipulated that the courts no longer
had the right to build and interpret the law. Courts had to refer to the legislative
body each time they had to interpret the law, or recognized the need for a new law.
Moreover, it is difficult to assess whether French judges were or were not market
friendly. Markets certainly existed in France before the Revolution, as well as State
intervention in the economy. Nobles were doing business. Further, according to La-
garde (2009), the French Civil Code was not aimed at ruling business relations, but
rather at restoring a durable civil peace. In practice, the Code did not rule business
relations and risky activities were not concerned by the Civil Code. Before and after
the revolution, business activities were ruled by commercial laws, which were special
laws concerning only merchants. There were special courts for commercial matters,
in which judges were chosen from businessmen. By contrast, the Code Civil advo-
cated models of contracts involving low risk, with a political objective of ensuring
social stability. Portalis, one of the writers of the code, made the distinction between
the civil laws and commercial laws. Referring to these commercial laws, he wrote
that “the spirit of these rules differs essentially from the spirit of civil laws” (see
Crettez, Deffains, Leyte, et al., 2011).
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In sum, each of the two previous explanations of French legal origins is historically
relevant and can be associated with an episode of legal change.10
But they tell only a small part of the story. Our aim in the next section is to provide
a model of French legal origins that takes into account another explanation proposed
notably by Tocqueville.
4 Legal Centralization at the Beginning of the Revolution
(1789-1791)
We now build a simple model to explain the transition from the Ancien Re´gime
legal system, characterized by legal decentralization, to the centralized legal system
which was set out at the eve of the French Revolution. We take our inspiration from
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Tocqueville, 1835). According to Tocqueville,
one of the driving forces shaping institutions is the continuous increase in the desire
for equality among citizens. In this respect, legal equality was difficult to implement
in a fragmented country like Ancien Re´gime France. Legal uniformity was then seen
as the only means to ensure legal equality before the law.
10 Johnson and Koyama (2014) also relates to French legal centralization. They rely on the idea of
Besley and Persson (2011) that legal capacity can come alongside fiscal capacity. They argue that
to finance wars, the French monarchy began to centralize its fiscal system at the beginning of the
XVIIth century. To perform this fiscal centralization, the King had to reorganize and harmonize
legal rules across French provinces. A small rise in legal centralization certainly occurred during
the XVIIth century, but even if the King favored legal centralization, this process didn’t go very
far. In addition, if legal centralization did increase, the legal system did not become more uniform.
(Barbiche, 2001).
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4.1 A Simple model of the degree of legal centralization
We assume that France comprises n local regions, i = 1, . . . , n, with 2 < n. A local
region is described by its ideal law xi (i.e., its legal preferences). We denote by `i the
actual law in region i.11 Each region i is inhabited by a representative agent whose
utility function is
Ui(`) = −1
2
(`i − xi)2 − α
2
1
n
n∑
j=1
(`j − `)2, (1)
where ` is the mean value of the actual laws across regions, ` = (`1, . . . , `n) and α is
a positive real number.
This utility function comprises two terms. The first one, −1
2
(`i−xi)2, represents the
cost of the divergence of region i’s laws from region i’s own legal preference. The
second one, −α
2
1
n
∑n
j=1(`j− `)2, represents agent i’s aversion to inequality before the
law. We capture this aversion by assuming that the utility function of each repre-
sentative agent decreases with respect to the variance ( 1
n
∑n
j=1(`j− `)2) of the actual
laws. The parameter α measures the intensity of the aversion to legal inequality.
The higher α is, the more agents become concerned about legal inequality.12
We further assume that the choice between the different degrees of legal centraliza-
tion relies on the comparison of the values taken by the sum of the representative
11 Both the actual and ideal laws are associated to points of the real line. We may interpret
these points as being the values of an aggregate index of specific legal rules. The construction of
aggregate indexes of legal rules is a current practice in the empirical law-and-economic literature
(see, e.g., Siems, 2011).
12 To ease the analyse, we also assume that the parameter α describing the intensity of the aversion
to legal inequality is the same across regions.
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agent’s utility functions across regions. Following Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), we
will compare two degrees of legal centralization. In the first degree, each region
chooses its own law `di , without cooperating with the other regions. By contrast,
in the second degree, regions cooperate in the sense that they all adopt the same
law. The first case corresponds to what we call the Ancien Re´gime equilibrium. The
second one corresponds to the legal centralization turn taken at the beginning of the
Revolution.
4.2 The Ancien Re´gime equilibrium
We interpret the Ancien Re´gime as the Nash equilibrium `d of the game where
each region chooses its actual legal rules `di , taking the choices of the other regions
as given. We assume that each region i is sufficiently small that its considers it
has no influence on the average decision (`d). We call this Nash equilibrium the
Ancien Re´gime Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the actual laws satisfy the following
conditions
−(`di − xi)−
α
n
(`di − `d) = 0. (2)
Thus for each region i the marginal benefit of a decrease in the distance between
the local law and the local preferences is equal to the marginal cost of the distance
between the local law and the average laws (e.g., a marginal increase in inequality
before the law).
From equation (2) we can compute the mean of the local decisions `di and we find
17
that
`d = x, (3)
where x = (
∑
i xi)/n is the mean value of the local ideal laws xi. Using equations
(2) and (3), we find that the equilibrium value of the actual law in region i is
`di =
xi +
α
n
x
1 + α
n
. (4)
The equilibrium value of the actual law in region i is itself an average between the
ideal law of this region and the mean value of the local ideal laws.13
Computing the equilibrium value of legal heterogeneity (the variance of the `di ), we
obtain
σ2`d =
σ2x
(1 + α
n
)2
, (5)
where σ2x is the variance of the ideal laws xi. We see that the equilibrium value of
legal heterogeneity decreases with respect to α, the parameter which measures the
intensity of the aversion to inequality before the law. When α goes to infinity, legal
uniformity is achieved, since all the equilibrium values of the actual laws converge
to l (see equation (4)).
13 Loeper (2011) shares some concerns and results with our model. In his paper, the preferences of
region’s i representative agent are as follows: Ui(`) = −(`i−xi)2− βN
∑
j 6=i(`i− `j)2. The utility of
agent i depends on the average distance between its region’s choice (`i) and other regions’ choices.
Therefore, agents do not care about the distance between the choices of two arbitrary regions. Thus
agents do no care about inequality before the law.
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The equilibrium value of agent’s i utility is
Ui(`d) = −1
2
(α
n
)2
(1 + α
n
)2
(xi − x)2 − α
2
σ2x
(1 + α
n
)2
. (6)
From the preceding expression we obtain the equilibrium value of the sum of the
utility functions
n∑
i=1
Ui(`d) = −nσ
2
x
2
(α
n
)2 + α
(1 + α
n
)2
. (7)
We shall next compare this value to the corresponding value obtained with legal
centralization.
4.3 The Tocqueville equilibrium
To analyze legal centralization, we now assume that the actual value of the law is
the same across regions. This value is supposed to be chosen by a decision maker
who maximizes the sum of the agents’ utility function (in the spirit of Glaeser and
Shleifer, 2002). Formally, the decision-maker problem is
max
`t
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(`c − xi)2, (8)
where `c is the value of the law that is applied in all the regions. We notice that by
construction the variance of the actual laws is nil, which implies that the cost of legal
heterogeneity is nil as well. To pay tribute to the work of Tocqueville on the French
Revolution we call the solution `c of this problem the Tocqueville Equilibrium.
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The first order (necessary and sufficient) condition for the choice of `t is
−
n∑
j=1
(`c − xi) = 0. (9)
From the above equation we deduce the value of the Tocqueville equilibrium
`c = x. (10)
Therefore, the value of the actual law is equal to the mean value of the ideal laws.
Agent i’s utility is
Ui(`c) = −1
2
(xi − x)2, (11)
where `c = (`c, . . . , `c) and the equilibrium value of the social objective function is
therefore
n∑
i=1
Ui(`c) = −n
2
σ2x. (12)
The Tocqueville equilibrium does not depend on α since the variance of the actual
laws is nil.
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4.4 Comparing the Ancien Re´gime and the Tocqueville
equilibria
We now compare the equilibrium value of the social objective functions in the An-
cien Re´gime (corresponding to the legal decentralization option) and the Tocqueville
equilibria (corresponding to the legal centralization option). Using equations (7) and
(12), we obtain the following Proposition
Proposition 1. Legal centralization is preferred to legal decentralization if and only
if the degree α of aversion to inequality before the law is higher than n
n−2 .
We rely on the previous Proposition to interpret the change in the preferred level of
law-making that occurred during the Revolution.
Before the Enlightenment, legal diversity was generally accepted since for the thinkers
of the XVIth century (Montaigne, 1595 (2009) for exemple) actual legal rules were
considered as natural laws. Even when law differed from the ideal one, a change in
existing rules wasn’t always considered as necessary (Ubrecht, 1933 (1969)).
Things began to change with the Enlightenment. Actual laws were no longer consid-
ered as natural (in the sense of exogenous). Rather, law had to express the will of the
nation. Philosophers made strong statements against all forms of legal inequality in
the Ancien Re´gime, be they horizontal or vertical. The most important opposition
concerned the so called privile`ges. Local differences were also contested because they
mostly reflected the inheritance of the past and lacked any rational basis. As Voltaire
(1819) put it
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Is it not an absurd and terrible thing that what is true in one village is
false in another? What kind of barbarism is it that citizens must live
under different laws? When you travel in this kingdom you change legal
systems as often as you change horses.
Philosophers of the Enlightenment advanced the idea that every set of rules had to be
rationally decided and that these rules should not differ across local areas, excepted
for well-specified reasons. To ensure equality of treatment between citizens, sentences
and incriminations had to be determined by a uniform national law, not by local
judges. Voltaire summarized these views in his article on Civil and Ecclesiastical
Laws (Voltaire, 1765): “One weight, one measure, one custom.... Every law should
be clear, uniform and precise.” Laws had to be thought of as unique rules applying
to everyone, even if individuals’ preferences were diverse (Carbasse, 2014). In that
case, uniformization of law had to precede uniformization of preferences.
Tocqueville discusses the influence of the Enlightenment in Chapter 1 of Part III of
the Ancien Re´gime and the Revolution (this chapter is entitled “How towards the
middle of the XVIII century men of letters took the lead in politics and the conse-
quences of this new development”).14 Tocqueville also considers that administrative
centralization before the Revolution had already slightly increased legal equality (this
is the topic of Book 2 of the Ancient Regime) and transformed mores by inculcated
sentiments of equality (see Pittz, 2011). When legal equality becomes the rule of
society, the slightest traces of inequality becomes unbearable to the people. This is
14 This idea of the influence of the Enlightenment on the Revolution was also proposed, inter alia,
by Portalis (1820). A turning point of the Enlightenment was the publication of the Encylopedie,
which spread the enlightened ideas throughout France (Darnton, 1973).
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notably spelled out in Chapter I of Book II of the Ancient Regime, which is entitled
“Why the feudal rights were more odious to the people in France than any where
else”. The conclusion of this chapter is as follows: “The feudal system, though
stripped of its political attributes, was still the greatest of our civil institutions; but
its very curtailment was the source of its unpopularity. It may be said, with per-
fect truth, that the destruction of a part of that system rendered the remainder a
hundred-fold more odious than the whole had ever appeared”. In sum, aversion to in-
equality before the law grew steadily and was therefore conducive to legal uniformity
when the Revolution occurred.15
Proposition 1 captures Tocqueville’s insight regarding the rise in aversion to inequal-
ity before the law. We consider that before the Enlightenment the degree α of
aversion to legal inequality was lower than n
n−2 . In that case legal decentralization
was indeed better than legal centralization because legal diversity was not a matter
of concern. By contrast, during the Enlightenment and the Revolution aversion to
inequality grew so much that the degree of aversion α became higher than n
n−2 < α.
In this case, legal centralization was the best choice.
15 Tocqueville clearly illustrated this evolution in the next passage (Chapter II, Book IV, Second
Volume of Democracy in America): “The very next notion to that of a sole and central power,
which presents itself to the minds of men in the ages of equality, is the notion of uniformity of
legislation. As every man sees that he differs but little from those about him, he cannot understand
why a rule which is applicable to one man should not be equally applicable to all others. Hence the
slightest privileges are repugnant to his reason; the faintest dissimilarities in the political institutions
of the same people offend him, and uniformity of legislation appears to him to be the first condition
of good government... Notwithstanding the immense variety of conditions in the Middle Ages, a
certain number of persons existed at that period in precisely similar circumstances; but this did not
prevent the laws then in force from assigning to each of them distinct duties and different rights.
On the contrary, at the present time all the powers of government are exerted to impose the same
customs and the same laws on populations which have as yet but few points of resemblance. ”
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Interestingly, when the degree α of aversion to inequality before the law increases
from n/(n − 2) to n2/(n − 2), the difference in the values of the social objectives
under the two regimes increases.16 When α = n2/(n−2), the advantage derived from
implementing legal centralization instead of legal decentralization is maximal. When
α further increases from n2/(n−2), however, this advantage starts to diminish. And
when α goes to infinity, the difference in the values of the social objectives tends
to zero. This is because, in the Ancien Re´gime equilibrium, as α goes to infinity
the law chosen by each region moves closer and closer to `c. An implication of this
remarks is that, without the Revolution, legal uniformity would have almost been
achieved if aversion to legal inequality had continued to grow ever. But other paths
towards legal uniformity could have been followed. For instance, legal convergence
could have been achieved by reducing legal diversity within the provinces. This kind
of option was briefly considered in 1792 and 1793, before the Reign of Terror. We
address this issue in the next section.
5 Legal Centralization in the Second Period of the Revolution
(1792-1793): Was a Girondin Equilibrium Possible ?
By implementing legal centralization at the begining of the French Revolution (1789-
1791), the National Assembly ended many Ancien Re´gime legal inequalities. This
evolution was contested since local identities remained strong and several provinces
were still seeing themselves as specific nations within the whole nation (see Ozouf,
16 Indeed, we can check that the difference
∑
i U di −
∑
i U ci is proportional to the function g(α) =
1−α(n−2n )
(1+αn )
2 .
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1984). To weaken these local identities and specificities inherited from history, the lo-
cal administration was reorganized. The new administrative system was built around
three levels: dpartement, district, municipality. Initially, each of the 83 dpartements
was conceived as a 70km × 70 km square. While the final design of departments
was different, the geometric approach of the initial design illustrates the will to break
references to past local entities and specificities and replace them with national unity
(Biard, 2010). All the new administrative levels were deprived of any judicial power
and were bound to execute the decisions taken by the legislative power in Paris. The
previous role of parliaments in the making of laws was completely eliminated.
The second step of the Revolution began with the fall of the king in 1791-1792,
necessitating a new constitution. Published in 1793, this this new constitution was
written by the leaders of the political faction “La Montagne”. The “Montagnards”
favored strict supervision of local application of national laws, notably by sending
commissars from Paris to monitor and control dpartemental offices and municipal
authorities.
The main political opponent of la “Montagne” was another political faction called
“La Gironde”. The members of this group, the “Girondins”, kept the idea of legal
equality but supported more legal decentralization, as well as giving more powers to
dpartements (Amson, 2010). The Girondins were strongly opposed to the growing
and now exclusive influence of Paris in the making of political and legal decisions. In
1792, the Girondin deputy Lasource argued that “The influence of Paris should be
reduced to 1/83th, as for any other dpartement” (Biard and Dupuy, 2014). While the
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Girondins did not explicitly present themselves as federalists17, they were accused by
the Montagnards, such as Camille Desmoulins, of wanting to transform France into
a “juxtaposition of small republics” (Chevallier, 2001). To prevent any partition of
the country, the National Assembly adopted on September 25, 1792, a declaration
stating that the French republic was one and indivisible. The Girondins were then
eliminated in a few months. This elimination modified the national representation
greatly. A constitution written in 7 days by the Montagnards, in which any attempt
to decentralize power was ruled out, was then approved by the National Assembly
on June 24, 1793. The concentration of legal and political powers in France became
more important thereafter than in any other period (Chevallier, 2001).
We now extend the model of the previous section by assuming that law-making can
be decided at an intermediate level between the local regions and the nation. We
then compare the resulting equilibrium, i.e., the Girondin equilibrium, with both the
Ancien Re´gime and the Tocqueville equilibria.
5.1 The Girondin model
Let us assume that France is divided into P different administrative provinces.18 The
set of these provinces is denoted P . A province P is comprised of nP local regions.
17 The idea that the Montagnards favored centralization whereas the Girondins favored decen-
tralization is disputed by some historians (see, i.e., Biard, 2010 or Ozouf, 1984). Girondins did
not explicitly require a federalist organization. The term “federalists” was used by their political
adversaries in order to discredit them. Gironde’s leaders needed to be very careful in their pub-
lic positions since in France, as stated by Ozouf (1984), the epithet “federalist” sent men to the
guillotine.
18 These provinces can be the Ancien Re´gime provinces, but they can also correspond to other
intermediate administrative levels, like the dpartements.
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Each province P chooses its law `P (that is, the law `P applies in all the regions i
contained in P ).
Given these assumptions, the preferences of agent i given in (1) can be written as
follows
Ui(`P ) = −1
2
(`P − xi)2 − α
2n
∑
P ′∈P
nP ′(`P ′ − `)2, (13)
where ` is the average value of the law across the different provinces. That is
` =
∑
P∈P
∑
i∈P
`P
n
=
∑
P∈P
nP
n
`P . (14)
5.2 The Girondin equilibrium
We assume that the law-makers of province P choose the actual law `P of the province
by maximizing the sum of the objective function of the region’s representative agents
(14). This contrasts with the Tocqueville equilibrium where the law-makers choose
the law so as to maximize the sum of all the region’s objective functions. We further
assume that the law-makers of province P consider the other provinces’ decisions
as given. A Girondin equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding non-
cooperative game. To study this equilibrium we first consider the provinces’ choices.
Taking the other provinces’ decisions `P ′ and the average decision ` as given, province
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P solves the following problem
max
`P
∑
i∈P
Ui(`) = max
`P
∑
i∈P
{
−1
2
(`P − xi)2 − α
2n
∑
P ′∈P
nP ′(`P ′ − `)2
}
. (15)
The optimal decision of province P satisfies the following condition
∑
i∈P
(`P − xi) + α
n
n2P (`P − `) = 0. (16)
Solving for `P we get
`P =
xP + α
nP
n
`
1 + αnP
n
, (17)
where xP is the mean value of the regions ideal legal laws
xP =
∑
i∈P
xi
nP
. (18)
Equation (17) expresses the optimal law of province P given the average value of the
laws across provinces. In equilibrium, this average value must be equal to the actual
average value. We now determine this equilibrium.
Summing equations (17) across provinces and solving for `, we find that
` =
∑
P∈P
nP
n
xP
1 + αnP
n
1− α
∑
P∈P
(
nP
n
)2(
1 + αnP
n
) . (19)
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Substituting (19) into (17), we get the equilibrium value of province P ’s decision
`P =
xP + α

∑
P ′∈P
nP ′
n
xP ′
1+α
nP ′
n
1− α∑P ′∈P (nP ′n )2(
1+α
nP ′
n
)

1 + αnP
n
. (20)
5.3 Comparison of the Girondin and the Tocqueville equilibria
Comparing the Girondin and the Tocqueville equilibria does not yield clear-cut re-
sults. We do have, however, a result when the aversion to inequality before the law α
goes to infinity. This result, which is proven in an appendix, is given by the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2. When aversion to inequality before the law is very high (i.e., when
α approaches infinity), legal centralization is always preferred to intermediate legal
decentralization.
When aversion to inequality before the law is extremely high (i.e., when α goes to
∞), all the provinces tend to choose the same law: limα→∞ `P = limα→∞ ` for all P ,
where
lim
α→+∞
` =
∑
P∈P
xP
P
. (21)
In this limit case, each province is better off by choosing a law close to the average
one. This is why the provinces’ equilibrium choices tend to be similar. Therefore,
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legal uniformity is achieved when the aversion to inequality before the law is very
high. We notice that the Ancien Re´gime equilibrium coincides with the Girondin
equilibrium when each province corresponds to one region. In this case, we have
limα→+∞ ` = l, and the limit equilibrium is equal to the Tocqueville equilibrium.
But in the other cases, limα→+∞ ` is different from l. Since l is the uniform value
of the actual law which maximizes the sum of the regions’ objectives, it follows
that the Girondin equilibrium can never dominate the Tocqueville equilibrium. This
conclusion, however, only applies to the limit case where aversion to legal inequality
is very high.
As we have seen in the previous section, a high level of legal centralization was
implemented at the beginning of the Revolution. The last step toward centralization
was made during the Napoleonic era, and culminated with the introduction of the
Civil Code of 1804. Despite the introduction of the Civil Code, however, judicial
control softened during the Napoleonic era compared to the initial revolutionary
decisions. We address this relaxation of judges’ control in the next section.
6 Legal Centralization and Judges’ Discretion: Understanding
the Napoleonic Phase
The complementarity between civil law and codification of the law is an important
thesis in legal studies. As Von Mehren (1957) put it: “In the civil law, large areas of
private law are codified. Codification is not typical of the common law”. For Glaeser
and Shleifer (2002), the first aim of codification is to control judges, transforming
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them into automata. The higher the desire of the central authority to impose its
will, the more precise the code has to be (in the sense of giving less room for judges’
interpretation of the law).19 According to these authors: “It is not surprising, in
that regard, that centralized civil law systems were often championed by the great
autocrats, like Napoleon.” A second, but less important aim of codification, is to
make adjudication more transparent.
Yet this analysis of codification is not really supported by the facts. While the Civil
code appeared in France in 1804, the will to control judges was already present at
the beginning of the Revolution. As we have seen, at that time judges’ decisions
were tightly controlled and adjudication was almost forbidden. Whenever an in-
terpretation of a law or a new law was needed, judges had to consult the National
Assembly, which had the monopoly of legal interpretation. It was soon realized, how-
ever, that a workable legal system required a certain level of judicial adjudication
(Carbasse, 2014, p. 243). As a result, at the end of the Revolution and under the
Napoleonic Empire, adjudication and legal interpretation were tolerated again. To
account for this evolution we now enrich the model of subsection 4.3 by introducing
judicial discretion. This enables us to study the interaction between a law-maker
who chooses the law that applies nationwide, and judges who adapt this law to local
needs. Furthermore, we consider the optimal degree of judicial discretion.
19 Glaeser and Shleifer propose an interesting model of codification as a means to control judicial
behavior. In their model, codification is considered as a set of “bright line rules” that trigger
automatic judicial decision-making when offenses reach a given level.
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6.1 A Model of legal centralization with regional judicial
discretion
We assume that in each region i a judge maximizes the following objective function
U ji (lc, a) = −
1
2
(`c + ai − xi)2 − θ
2
a2i −
α
2n
n∑
j=1
(aj − a)2. (22)
In this function, the actual value of the law in region i is `c + ai. The first term `
c
of this sum is the law decided in a centralized way (i.e., statute). We interpret the
second term ai as the adjudication decision made by the judge. To wit, the term ai
represents the change in the legislation `c decided by the judge to adapt the law to
the needs of region i. We denote by a the vector of the judge’s decisions, and by a
the mean of these decisions.
Since the actual law in region i is `c + ai, the variance of the actual laws over the
regions is equal to the variance of the judges’ adjudication decisions
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
`c + ai − (`c + a)
)2
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
(aj − a)2. (23)
We observe that the objective function of the judge in region i is equal to the objective
function of the regional representative agent up to the term (θ/2)(ai)2. This term
captures the cost borne by the judge to adapt the law to local conditions. We consider
that judges are benevolent, but departing from the law `c is costly for them. The
parameter θ describes how discretion is costly. The higher θ, the higher the cost
borne by judge i to adapt the law to local conditions.
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6.2 Equilibrium with legal centralization and judicial discretion
We now study the equilibrium of the model with legal centralization and judicial
discretion. We assume that the law-maker (be it the Emperor or the National As-
sembly) first chooses the law `c that applies to the whole country. Then judges make
their adjudication decisions without consultation. To solve for the subgame perfect
equilibrium, we work backward. We first study the Nash equilibrium of the game
between the judges assuming that they take the value of the legislation `c as given.
Next, we study the law-maker’s problem. The law-maker acts as a Stackelberg leader:
it takes into account the fact that the equilibrium adjudication decisions depend on
`c.
6.2.1 The Nash equilibrium of the games between the judges
In any Nash equilibrium the region i judge’s decision ai must satisfy the following
first-order condition
−(`c + ai − xi)− θai − α
n
(ai − a) = 0, (24)
from which we deduce that
ai =
(xi − `c) + αan
1 + θ + α
n
. (25)
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To compute the equilibrium value of the mean a, we sum the above equation across
regions which yields
a =
x− `c
1 + θ
. (26)
After a little algebra, we find that the utility of agent’s i is given by
Ui(`c, a) = −1
2
1
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
((
(θ +
α
n
)(`c − xi)− α
n
`c − x
1 + θ
)2
+ ασ2x
)
, (27)
and the variance of the judges’s decisions is equal to
σ2a =
1
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
σ2x. (28)
6.2.2 The equilibrium value of the law `c
We now determine the equilibrium value of the law `c. Recall that we assume that
the law-maker (e.g., the Emperor) maximizes the sum of the representative agents’
objective functions Ui with respect to `c
max
`c
n∑
i=1
Ui(`c, a) = max
`c
−1
2
1
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
n∑
i=1
(
(θ +
α
n
)(`c − xi)− α
n
`c − x
1 + θ
)2
− nα
2
1
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
σ2x (29)
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The first-order condition is
−
n∑
i=1
(
(θ +
α
n
)(`c − xi)− α
n
`c − x
1 + θ
)
(θ +
α
n
− α
n(1 + θ)
) = 0, (30)
⇐⇒ (θ + α
n
)(`c − x)− α(`
c − x)
n(1 + θ)
= 0. (31)
We deduce from the last equation that
`c = x, (32)
and that the equilibrium value of region i judge’s decision is
ai =
xi − x
1 + θ + α
n
, (33)
The equilibrium value of the region i representative agent’s objective function is
U c,di = −
1
2
(θ + α
n
)2
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
(xi − x)2 − α
2
1
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
σ2x. (34)
If we sum equation (34) across regions, we find that the equilibrium value of the sum
of the representative agents’ objective functions is
n∑
i=1
U c,di = −
1
2
nσ2x
α + (θ + α
n
)2
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
. (35)
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6.3 The optimal value of judicial’s discretion
We now study the optimal value of judges’ discretion. In the Ancien Re´gime version
of the model, the judge’s discretion is maximal. This corresponds to the case where
θ = 0. Adapting the law to local conditions is not costly. In the version of the model
describing the aftermath of the Revolution, the judge’s discretion is nil (θ = +∞).
In this case, adapting the law to local conditions is too costly (the higher θ, the
lower the value of judges’ discretion). We determine the optimal degree of control
over judges’ decisions by finding the values of θ which maximize the social objective
(35). These values minimize the following function of θ
Γ(θ) =
(θ + α
n
)2 + α
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
. (36)
Using this function we obtain the next result20
Proposition 3. There is a unique optimal value of the judges’ discretion. This level
is given by:
θ = α(1− 1
n
). (37)
Moreover, the higher the degree of aversion to legal inequality (i.e., the higher α),
the lower the optimal value of judges’ discretion (i.e., the higher θ).
The optimal value of judges’ discretion results from a trade-off. To understand this
trade-off, let us consider the equilibrium value of the representative agent of region
20 The Proposition results from the fact that Γ′(θ) = 2(
θ−α(1− 1n ))
(1+θ+αn )
3 .
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i’s utility function
U c,di = −
1
2
(θ + α
n
)2
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
(xi − x)2 − α
2
1
(1 + θ + α
n
)2
σ2x.
The first term in the right-hand side of the above equation expresses the loss incurred
by agent’s i, which results from the divergence between his legal preferences and the
equilibrium value of the local law. As we have seen, when θ = 0 judges’ discretion is
maximal and the regional judge maximizes agent i’s objective function by choosing
`c + ai = xi. On the other hand, when θ goes to infinity, the actual equilibrium
value of the law goes to x which is the value of the law `c chosen by the central law-
maker (for example, the National Assembly). We see that the first part of agent’s
i loss increases with θ. The smaller the judges’ discretion, the greater the region’s
loss. The second part of the above expression correspond to the loss due to legal
heterogeneity. This part always decreases with θ. Indeed, the higher θ is, the lower
judges’ discretion, and the lower legal heterogeneity.
When θ increases from 0, the gain resulting from the decrease in legal heterogeneity
more than compensates for the increase in the divergence between the law and legal
preferences. This happens until θ reaches its optimal level α(1− 1
n
). When θ increases
from this level, the gain from the decrease in legal heterogeneity is lower than the
increase in the additional loss resulting from the divergence between the actual law
and legal preferences. Proposition 3 shows that is is never optimal to eliminate
judges’ discretion (i.e., θ = ∞), nor is it optimal to allow complete discretion (i.e.,
θ = 0). The Proposition also shows how the optimal degree of discretion changes
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with α, the degree of aversion to legal inequality. The higher α, the higher the weight
given to the loss due to legal heterogeneity, and the higher the need to control judges’
decisions.
We can rely on Proposition 3 to interpret the decisions made during the Revolu-
tion and the First French Empire. At the beginning of the Revolution, the National
Assembly sought to control judges’ decision. As we have mentioned, the National
Assembly went so far as to forbid any adjudication. But forbidding judicial adjudi-
cation turned out to be unworkable. Formally, choosing θ = +∞ was not the best
decision. After the Revolution, and the introduction of the Civil and Penal Codes,
judges’ discretion was tolerated again. Choosing a finite positive value of θ was
indeed a better decision.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of French legal centralization in which the evolution of
aversion to legal inequality plays a key role. We believe that legal centralization began
a decisive phase with the French Revolution and was triggered by a sharp increase in
the aversion to legal inequality. This approach completes the view according to which
the Revolution and the Empire were just the continuation of an older process. For
sure, there was a sustained policy of legal centralization during the Ancien Re´gime.
Little by little, the feudal order was diminished and the nobility deprived of political
and judicial powers. In this perspective, however legal centralization was a means to
impose the King’s will on the whole Kingdom; it was not a means to achieve legal
equality.
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An important implication of our analysis is that it does not support the argument of
La Porta et al. (2008) that “regardless of whether the revolutionary or the medieval
story is correct, they have very similar empirical predictions.” If our analysis is
correct, wealth measures such as GDP per capita should not be the only criteria
used to compare the virtues of alternative legal organizations. Qualitative measures
such as the degree of inequality before the law should also be taken into account.
Focusing only on economic outcomes can bring about misleading conclusions on the
costs and benefits of each legal system, and erroneous policy recommendations as
well.
We found that a centralized legal system works better with a moderate judicial
control. Judges should not behave as automata and codes must not be too precise.
Statutory interpretation is key to adapt the law to local conditions. In our view
this explains why the will to control judges was lesser under the Napoleonic era than
under the revolutionary one (Carbasse, 2014). But in contrast to Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002), the motivation to control judges did not stem from the wish to impose the
will of the sovereign, but rather to limit the legal inequalities resulting from legal
decentralization. When citizens value legal equality, centralization and codification
can be optimal for the society as a whole, and not only for the political rulers.
Two important points deserve further research. First, to model aversion to legal
inequality we have assumed that individual preferences are decreasing with the vari-
ance of the actual laws. It would be interesting to look for alternative measures of
aversion to legal inequality and to allow for individual heterogeneity in the degree of
this aversion as well. Second, we have relied on a static analysis of the relationships
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between legal centralization and aversion to legal inequality. Since the demand for
legal equality is self perpetuating (as Tocqueville noticed), a dynamic analysis of the
long-run consequences of a one-time shift in favor of egalitarian institutions could
better our understanding of the origins of French legal centralization.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
• Step 1
We first prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. We have: limα→+∞ ` =
∑
P∈P
xP
P .
Proof. Let us defined u = 1/α. We can then rewrite equation (19) as follows:
` =
u
(∑
P∈P
nP
n
xP
u+
nP
n
)
1−∑P∈P (nPn )2(
u+
nP
n
) (38)
Using L’Hospital’s rule, we have:
lim
u→0
` = lim
u→0
∑
P∈P
nP
n
xP
u+
nP
n
− u(∑P∈P nPn xP(
u+
nP
n
)2 )
∑
P∈P
(
nP
n
)2(
u+
nP
n
)2 (39)
=
∑
P∈P
xP
P
(40)
• Step 2
Recall that the equilibrium value of the social objective in the Tocqueville equilibrium
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given (12) is:
n∑
i=1
Ui = −1
2
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 (41)
The value of the social objective associated to a girondin equilibrium (associated to
a set of P provinces) is:
n∑
i=1
Ui = −1
2
∑
P∈P
∑
i∈P
(`P − xi)2 − α
2
∑
P ′∈P
nP ′(`P ′ − `)2 (42)
where `P and ` are given respectively by equations (17) and (19).
We now compare the values of the social objectives given in equations (41) and (42).
To do this, we first study the difference:
4 =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 −
∑
P∈P
∑
i∈P
(`P − xi)2 (43)
We have:
4 =
∑
P∈P
∑
i∈P
(xi − x¯)2 −
(
xi −
xP + α
nP
n
`
1 + αnP
n
)2 (44)
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=
∑
P∈P
∑
i∈P
{
x2i − 2xix+ x2 −
[
x2i − 2xi
(xP + αnPn `
1 + αnP
n
)
+
x2P + 2αxP `
nP
n
+ α2(nP
n
)2(`)2(
1 + αnP
n
)2
]}
(45)
=
∑
P∈P
{
−2nPxPx+ nPx2 + 2nPxP
(xP + αnPn `
1 + αnP
n
)− nP (x2P + 2αxP `nPn + α2(nPn )2(`)2(
1 + αnP
n
)2 )
}
(46)
= −2nx2 + nx2 + 2(∑
P∈P
nPx
2
P
1 + αnP
n
+ `
∑
P∈P
nPxPα
nP
n
1 + αnP
n
)
(47)
−
∑
P∈P
nPx
2
P(
1 + αnP
n
)2 − 2`∑
P∈P
nPxPα
nP
n(
1 + αnP
n
)2 − (`)2∑
P∈P
nP
(
αnP
n
)2(
1 + αnP
n
)2 (48)
= −nx2 +
∑
P∈
npx
2
P
1 + αnP
n
(2− 1
1 + αnP
n
) + 2`
∑
P∈P
α
nP
n
nPxP
( 1
1 + αnP
n
− 1
(1 + αnP
n
)2
)
(49)
− (`)2
∑
P∈P
nPα
2(nP
n
)2(
1 + αnP
n
)2 (50)
= −nx2 +
∑
P∈
npx
2
P(
1 + αnP
n
)2 (1 + 2αnPn ) + 2`∑
P∈P
α
nP
n
nPxP
( 1
1 + αnP
n
− 1
(1 + αnP
n
)2
)
(51)
− (`)2
∑
P∈P
nPα
2(nP
n
)2(
1 + αnP
n
)2 (52)
= −nx2 +
∑
P∈
npx
2
P(
1 + αnP
n
)2 (1 + 2αnPn ) + 2`∑
P∈P
nPxP
αnP
n
(1 + αnP
n
)
(
1− 1
(1 + αnP
n
)
)
(53)
− (`)2
∑
P∈P
nPα
2(nP
n
)2(
1 + αnP
n
)2 (54)
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Moreover, we have:
α
∑
P∈P
nP (`P − `)2 = α
∑
P∈P
nP
( xP − `
1 + αnP
n
)2
(55)
= α
∑
P∈P
nP
x2P − 2xcP `+ (`)2(
1 + αnP
n
)2 (56)
Using (54) and (56) we find that the differences of the objective values (up to a scalar
1/2) is as follows:
lim
α→+∞
{
4(α)− α
∑
P∈P
nP (`P − `)2
}
= −nx2 + 2nx
∑
P∈P
xP
P
− n(∑
P∈P
xP
P
)2
(57)
= −n(x−∑
P∈P
xP
P
)2
(58)
< 0. (59)
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